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Scholars suggest that public relations research is moving away
from or beyond J. Grunig and L. Grunig's (e.g., 1992) well-known and
much-discussed symmetrical model of public relations and toward
cocreational models (Botan & Taylor, 2004). In particular, they
suggest that dialogic theories, processes, and procedures best define
the study and practice of public relations. One of the first to discuss
dialogue, Pearson (1989b), argued that “the goal of public relations is
to manage these communication systems such that they come as close
as possible to the standards deduced from the idea of dialogue” (p.
128).
His untimely death kept him from further pursuing his standards
of dialogue, but his writings make the worth of the pursuit clear:
The important question becomes, not what action or policy is
more right than another (a question that is usually posed as a
monologue), but what kind of communication system maximizes
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the chances competing interests can discover some shared
ground and be transformed or transcended.
(Pearson, 1989a,p. 206)
The idea of maximizing participation of all competing voices runs
parallel to Jurgen Habermas's theory of communicative action and the
resulting discourse ethics as has been mentioned by communication
scholars, including Pearson (1989b) (see also, Kent & Taylor, 1998;
Leeper, 1996; Meisenbach, 2006). Continuing interest in Habermas's
theories can assist scholars in the pursuit of dialogic standards. In that
tradition, we seek to develop Habermas's (1990, 1993) concept and
procedure of discourse ethics as one such standard for dialogic public
relations.
Leeper (1996) and Meisenbach (2006) offered entry points into
the dialogic potential of public relations by employing Habermas's
discourse ethics. Despite these and other theoretical discussions (e.g.,
Kent & Taylor, 2002), actual examples of dialogic public relations are
very difficult to find. The question remains then, what obstacles
prevent organizations from enacting a truly dialogic model of public
relations and further what might that model look like?
We begin by discussing recent public relations research on the
developing dialogic roles of publics and review relevant concepts of
Habermas's communicative action and discourse ethics. We then
consider these issues and methods in relation to a recent corporate
controversy between the Walt Disney Company and the shareholderfocused revolt known as the Save Disney campaign. We apply
Habermas's (1990,1993, see also Leeper, 1996; Meisenbach, 2006)
concept and procedure of discourse ethics as a standard for dialogic
public relations, using it to analyze the successes and failures of the
rhetorical moves made by both the Walt Disney Company and Save
Disney campaign from 2002 to 2005. This case provides an
opportunity to identify obstacles, opportunities, and strategies for
enacting discourse ethics within dialogic public relations practice.
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Publics and Dialogue
Public relations scholars are reconceptualizing publics with
increasing frequency. First, there are the progressively more blurred
lines between individual and organizational rhetors (Cheney &
McMillan, 1990; Crable, 1990). In addition, Botan and Taylor (2004)
pointed out that early public relations scholarship took a functional
approach to publics, viewing them as a means for achieving an
organization’s goals. However, they noted a turn in the research
toward a cocreational perspective of organization–public relations (e.
g., Leitch & Neilson, 2001). Publics in this sense are not passive
recipients of public relations strategies, but are active and engaged “as
producers and reproducers of the community of discourse”
(Chay-Nemeth, 2001, p. 2).
Vasquez and Taylor (2001) provided additional direction for how
scholars might begin to advance the ways in which publics are
addressed. Publics should be framed as rhetorical communities. This
perspective brings a communicative framework to the forefront,
viewing “a public as a rhetorical community that emerges over time
through communication interactions such that a group consciousness
is developed around an issue or a concern” (Vasquez & Taylor, 2001,
p. 147; see also Springston & Keyton, 2001). The public envisioned
here also parallels what Botan and Taylor (2004) referred to as a
cocreational public that is actively involved in a meaning-making
process. It suggests a form of public relations that embraces the
presence of rhetoric in organization-public relations (R. L. Heath,
2001).
The challenge is to view publics and organizations in a dialogic
perspective both theoretically and practically (Botan, 1997; R. L.
Heath, 2001). Because of difficulty of the difficulty of operationalizing
dialogue, most research fails to incorporate a sense of the back and
forth between organizations and publics. Many public relations studies
focus on how the organization defends itself against challenges with
very little consideration of the rhetorical positions of publics, except as
obstacles that must be overcome (e.g., L. Grunig, 1992). On the other
side is activist research, which has focused primarily on the rhetoric of
the non-organizational challengers (e.g., Reber & Berger, 2005).
Scholars are still looking for integrated considerations of the rhetoric of
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both sides, and how that can or fails to engage in dialogic
consideration of the contested issues (Edwards, 2006). Perhaps, the
best example of this kind of work is found in Brimeyer, Eaker, and
Clair's (2004) study of the agitation and control typologies present in a
labor union and employing company's rhetoric during a crisis.
However, they focused on classifying the strategies of each party
rather than on defining the connections between them or the
procedure through which they sought to persuade each other. So while
public relations scholars recognize the need for a dialogic perspective
(R. L. Heath, 2001; Pearson, 1989a, 1989b), most research in the
area has failed to examine what this dialogue might look like in
practice. We turn to discourse ethics as a way of seeing and
understanding public relations dialogue in action.

Communicative Action and Dialogue
Habermas's promotion of communicative action as a process in
which all stakeholders have access to public deliberation resonates
with calls for dialogic public communication. Because of the complexity
and value of Habermas's work for pursuing and understanding
dialogue in public relations, we first provide an introduction to his
communicative action and then explore how communicative action
provides for his theory of discourse ethics.
Habermas's (1984, 1987) theory of communicative action
focuses on how people act within the lifeworld, which is the context
and background of meaning that humans inherit through culture and
which defines how they see the world. The lifeworld comprises three
rationalization structures: personality, culture, and society. Each
rationality represents a divergent way of seeing and making sense of
the lifeworld, and Habermas argued that all three structures of
rationality should be maintained and balanced in modern society.
Personal rationality addresses internal concerns, how we talk to
ourselves. Cultural rationality focuses on social concerns that are
publicly considered, while societal rationality circumvents discussion
and is driven by forces of power and profit.
Habermas's discussion of societal and cultural rationalities leads
to his discourse ethics. Stemming from modern society's increasing
bureaucratization, societal rationality's forces of power and profit
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problematically dominate or colonize the lifeworld. Whereas cultural
rationality entails open discussion and debate about claims, societal or
system rationality does not involve this type of discussion; it sidesteps
discussion. Often today's corporations employ a form of societal
rationality and bypass public deliberation of issues and decisions that
publics believe they should be involved in discussing. That is, publics
often call for the type of debate entailed in communicative action while
corporations ignore this call (see Deetz, 1992).
In contrast to the corporate tendency toward societal rationality,
Habermas focused on and promoted cultural rationality developed
through communicative action. Habermas (1984) defined
communicative action as “the type of interaction in which all
participants harmonize their individual plans of action with one another
and thus pursue their illocutionary aims without reservation” (p. 294).
Furthermore, communicative action is based on the debate of
criticizable validity claims.
The bases of validity claims include: the truth, normative
rightness, and sincerity of the claim being made (Habermas, 1984). In
communicative action the publics must be able to take a stance of yes
or no in relation to these claims and judge to what extent they see the
speaker's statement as true, right, and sincere. First, claims are
judged by whether they are true or untrue, that is, a speaker asserts
and a listener may challenge whether a statement is true. In addition
to the truth or falsity of statements, validity of claims is also judged by
rightness. In other words, by saying some statement p, the speaker
asserts that “It is right that p” (1987). Finally, the validity of claims is
judged by the standard of sincerity. These claims to sincerity address
“the truthfulness that the speaker claims for expression of a subjective
experience to which he has privileged access” (1984, p. 309). Judging
this claim requires knowledge of the speaker's intention (J. Heath,
2001), which participants judge by available contextual information.
Habermas (1990) argued that all three validity claims are
present in every utterance. Every time a speaker makes an utterance
within the framework of cultural rationality, she wants the audience to
accept the truth, rightness, and sincerity of her statement. As
Meisenbach (2006) noted:
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The appealing suggestion of the copresence of the validity
claims is that the truth or falsity of a statement does not stand
separate from its rightness and sincerity. If I say, “I give money
to the United Way,” I am arguing (cognitively) that it is true
that I donate money to the United Way. On a moral level, I am
also claiming that donating to the United Way is right or just in
this situation and that it is ethical for me to present such an
argument. Finally, I am claiming on the aesthetic level to be
truthful or sincere (rather than sarcastic or contradictory to my
other statements and actions) in my utterance. All three claims
are present in my utterance, ready to be defended. (p.42)
Thus, truth, rightness, and sincerity of utterances remain
necessarily connected and ideally are considered together. When
placed in the context of public relations, if they discuss their claims at
all, corporations often limit themselves to focusing on the truth or
falsity of their claims, while overlooking discussion of whether the
utterance promotes something good or is sincerely offered. It is
worthy of mention that consideration of the truth and rightness validity
claims is very similar to how the issues management literature (e.g.,
R. L. Heath, 1997) considers gaps in organization-public perceptions of
questions of fact and value relating to issues. In addition, the third
validity claim, sincerity, can be linked to discussions of the
management of credibility or ethos. Habermas argues that these three
points of contest are simultaneously part of decisions about whether to
accept the policy suggested by an utterance.
While believing that this debate of validity claims occurs via
communicative action, Habermas argued that one of the primary
reasons that communicative action is disrupted is the colonization of
the lifeworld. This colonization occurs when the non-discursive steering
mechanisms of profit and power the cultural rationality value spheres,
corrupting and halting the process of communicative action. This
stance is distinct from R. L. Heath’s (2001) suggestion that a process
of statement and counterstatement will continue after the introduction
of a profit motive. Habermas suggests that the introduction of a
societal rationality statement into public discourse is colonizing
because it short-circuits the debate of validity claims, leading to
automatic support for whatever action enhances efficiency and profit.
Societal rationality stops the conversation. For example, in the
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colonized lifeworld, if someone offers free computers for every student
at a university, the university would automatically accept the gift
because doing so fits the profit steering mechanism. The lack of
discussion means that questions about whether students need the
same computers, what impact the computers will have on education,
or how the university might become obligated to the donor will not be
considered; communicative action is bypassed.
For Habermas, the goal is not to eliminate societal rationality.
Rather, a balance between cultural and societal rationality is needed.
Within today's modern corporations, tendencies toward societal
rationality are strong. In particular, public relations practice, which
seems geared toward the promotion of cultural rationality, mutual
understanding, and agreement, is often stymied by the profit and
power motives of today's corporate culture.1 However, in an age of
increasingly stronger calls for corporate social responsibility,
organizations should attend to their roles as a part of both the societal
(i.e., profit making centers) and the cultural (i.e., socially responsible
entities) spheres.
Habermas's discourse ethics can be seen as an attempt to keep
societal rationality and its nondiscursive steering mechanisms of power
and money in check. This perspective can guide organizations toward
dialogic public relations and help scholars and practitioners understand
how publics react to the actions and statements of organizations.

Discourse Ethics
Habermas’s (1990, 1993, 1996) discourse ethics outlines a
procedure for moral deliberation based on his Principle of
Universalization (Principle U), which states that all affected by an
utterance can accept those consequences. Leeper (1996) pursued
discourse ethics as an alternative to the relativism of the situational
perspective in public relations. He discussed how Habermas's
conceptualization of the ideal speech situation and validity claims could
be used to generate codes of ethics for public relations practitioners.
He concluded that Habermas’s work could be used to both evaluate
and guide public relations practices. However, while providing an
excellent background on the antecedents to discourse ethics, Leeper's
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work did not fully address the procedural implications of Habermas’s
development of Principle U.
Meisenbach (2006) explicated the implications of discourse
ethics for scholars by breaking down Principle U into five practical
steps:
1. identify an utterance for deliberation,
2. identify all stakeholders who would be affected by the
implementation of this utterance,
3. articulate the utterance to all identified as affected,
4. discursively debate among affected parties the consequences
and value of the utterance, and
5. form judgment of the validity and acceptability of the
proposed utterance.
These steps are presented as the procedure for enacting Habermas's
discourse ethics and thus as a framework for assessing the rhetorical
moves of organizations and publics.
Through this discourse ethics procedure, various norms and
individual ethical standards are established, challenged, and altered.
The universal aspect of Principle U in fact suggests that this procedure
occurs universally and naturally, regardless of culture or willingness of
individual participants. As such it means that even when a particular
organization resists the procedure or skips steps in it, that as long as
societal rationality has not completely eliminated cultural rationality
then Principle U is salient. If concerns of corporate responsibility and
accountability to shareholders belong to the realm of cultural
rationality, this means that even when organizations choose to ignore
these steps they remain relevant terms of debate.
Meisenbach (2006) used this procedure as an analytical
framework for understanding and assessing public resistance to the
American Red Cross's (ARC) establishment and use of the Liberty Fund
after the terrorist attacks in 2001. She found that while the ARC had
violated (skipped some of) the steps inherent in Principle U, publics
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still followed the procedure and criticized the ARC's private decision
about handling the funds. This example focused on the relevance of
the principle to the rhetoric of a non-profit organization. Because of its
universality, discourse ethics has much explanatory and analytical
potential for those interested in understanding and assessing relations
among publics and all kinds of organizations. To demonstrate and
expand this potential, we examine how the policies and practices of
the Walt Disney Company (WDC) were challenged first by internal
board members and then by an ad hoc activist organization known as
Save Disney. Specifically, we analyze the relevant and accessible
rhetoric from these parties from 2002 to 2005 seeking their enactment
and/or denial of a discourse ethics procedure.

The Bid to Save Disney: The Case of the Save
Disney Campaign
Many people have long been fascinated by the operations and
seeming magic that is the Walt Disney Company (WDC) empire. The
company and its trademark characters are known worldwide. WDC is
the second largest media and entertainment company in the world: Its
enterprises include its theme parks, movie and television studios, and
consumer products (Hoover’s, 2007). In 2006, the company had over
130,000 employees, nearly one million shareholders, and revenues in
excess of $34 billion (Hoover’s, 2007; Walt Disney Company, 2006a,
2006b). The “magic” that; surrounds the company’s history and
current operations explains why this organization garners worldwide
interest.
Many have tried to capture the lore of Disney through narratives
of the company’s history and biographies about its leaders. Beyond
telling the story of Disney, business, sociology, media, and
organizational communication scholars have long been interested in
Walt Disney (the founder) and the WDC. Much of the scholarly work
analyzes the content of the movies and characters produced by the
company (e.g. Hoerrner, 1996; Lacroix, 2004). Other work addresses
the mythology of the company and juxtaposes the constructed story of
Walt Disney and the magical company that he created with the
“reality” of the man and the company’s existence (Boje, 1995; Wasko,
2001). These investigations address what Disney means in society.
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Disney’s magical culture is a large part of the success of the
larger organization. However, efforts to create and preserve magic are
juxtaposed with the practices needed to maintain profitability. Smith
and Eisenberg (1987) analyzed the specific communicative practices
and metaphors tied to the company’s culture as they addressed how
WDC management and employees created and negotiated a conflict
during the 1980s at the southern California theme park, Disneyland.
The authors highlighted the degree to which management’s focus on
the need to cut corners conflicted with employee desires to retain the
family focus of the company. Specifically the connotations of the family
metaphor in the WDC culture (primarily articulated by employees)
conflicted with the profit and efficiency focused needs associated with
the drama metaphor (primarily used by management). The authors did
not focus on the ways in which this conflict exemplifies the tension
that Habermas highlighted between the system and the other spheres
of the lifeworld. However, such a parallel exists and could be explored
further.
Disney’s challenge of maintaining a balance between societal
and cultural rationality is highlighted in the shareholder-driven revolt
known as the Save Disney campaign. While this particular campaign
and the events surrounding it brought these issues to light, the culture
of the WDC had already created the conditions for these problems. In
what follows, we outline the communicative stance adopted by the
company leading up to the campaign and analyze the particular
rhetorical strategies employed by the WDC and the managers of the
Save Disney campaign. In so doing, we seek to identity both moments
in which the principle of discourse ethics was employed and those in
which opportunities for engaging in dialogue were missed.

Analyzing the WDC/Save Disney Dialogue
In this analysis we focus on how the rhetoric of the WDC and
Save Disney campaign seeks, denies, and contributes to dialogue,
specifically comparing it to a discourse ethics procedure. We begin
with the WDC culture and rhetoric just prior to the formation of the
Save Disney campaign, focusing on how it relates to dialogue and
discourse ethics.
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Disney’s Corporate Culture of (Non) Dialogue
To understand the goals and strategies of the Save Disney
campaign, it is helpful to first understand the communicative culture at
the WDC. The board of directors at the WDC had a history of limiting
open discussion of company practices long before Save Disney began
(see Smith & Eisenberg, 1987). The analysis that follows suggests that
similar issues affected the board of directors of the WDC in the 1990s
and beyond.
In the 1990s, two WDC board members, Roy Disney, Walt
Disney’s nephew, and Stanley Gold, Roy’s lawyer and friend, began to
challenge the decision-making processes of the board and particularly
the leadership of Michael Eisner, WDC CEO and chair of the board.
According to Stewart (2005), for several years Roy and Gold felt that
their verbally expressed concerns had been ignored. Both men had
spoken directly to Eisner about their concerns and tried unsuccessfully
to remind him of a promise he had allegedly made in the 1980s that
he would step down if the two men ever questioned that he was still
right for the job. In 2002, Gold began sending letters to the board
members expressing the same concerns.
In August 2002, Gold wrote a letter to fellow board member Ray
Watson who had been quoted in a news article suggesting that the
whole board supported Eisner. Gold, who recently had been harshly
reprimanded by Eisner for allegedly talking to the media himself (an
accusation Gold vehemently denied), wrote:
We, the Directors, are guilty of not discussing the real issues
affecting the company. We have not fully and critically
addressed the failed plans of our executives or the broken
promises that management has made to the Board and the
shareholders... We are too polite, too concerned with hurting
each other's feelings, when our real job is (a) to protect the
shareholders and (b) to coalesce around a management team
and a plan that we believe will get us out of our current malaise.
(quoted in Stewart, 2005, p. 404)
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Gold was arguing that the board was guilty of squashing dissent and
ignoring problems.
Board members and investors began challenging Gold over
allegations that he had been taking his grievances to the press, that is,
to those outside of the WDC board of directors. The day after Gold
spoke with a New York Times reporter (after gaining Eisner’s
permission to do so) influential investor Sid Bass wrote a letter Gold
and copied it to all of the board members:
every board member has a fiduciary duty not to make
statements to investors, investment bankers, and the press
which will damage the company...I am not addressing the
merits of either side of a debate, but how a debate is properly
waged...you must play by the rules or step down.
(as cited in Stewart, 2005, pp. 406-407)
Bass’s words make clear that the norms inside WDC promoted a
very narrow definition of acceptable debate, much less dialogue. The
assumption was that the only appropriate place for debating the
management of the Company was the boardroom. Bass's letter also
suggested that board members are not supposed to share any
negative information, even with the shareholders. In a response to
Bass, Gold argued: “The problem at the Walt Disney Company is not
Stanley Gold, it is not leaks (real or imagined) or unprofessional
conduct, but instead it is poor performance, lack of credibility and
accountability and poor capital allocation” (p. 408). This statement
sums up the arguments and utterances that Gold and Roy had been
trying to present to the board and became the cornerstone of the Save
Disney campaign that was to come.
Amidst this contentious communicative environment, a
September 2002 board meeting loomed. Gold continued to try to
generate support for his stance. Gold’s arguments centered on his
contention that the CEO was not providing even the board with all of
the financial information it needed to make responsible decisions in the
interest of shareholders. So at the September board meeting, Gold
formally presented his case. However, there was no discussion
afterward, and his subsequent request to call for a vote on whether to
hire outside consultants to better assess the situation was resisted and
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tabled. At the same meeting, Eisner presented his own action plan and
urged a unanimous vote of support for the plan to show board unity to
the outside world. Roy refused and that vote was also tabled to avoid
formalizing the board’s split to outsiders. The “decisions” to avoid
making decisions appeared to be a norm and established a culture that
clearly violated the discourse ethics procedure. In a letter of April 3,
2003 to director George Mitchell (copied to all directors) Gold
challenged this procedural issue, saying: “I fear that our inability to
discuss difficult problems and make hard decisions is an abdication of
our fiduciary duty” (as cited in Stewart, 2005, p. 431). But such
statements made little difference.
The issue came to a head in November 2003, when a board
member met with Roy to tell him that the board members had decided
that he would not be renominated to the board. In response, Roy
resigned from the board and his position in animation. Gold resigned
soon afterward and his resignation letter, posted on the original
December 2003 Save Disney website, noted that the decision to
remove Roy from the board was “yet another attempt by this board to
squelch dissent by hiding behind the veil of ‘good governance.’ What a
curious result.” He also questioned the recent WDC policy “barring
board members from communicating with shareholders and the media”
and suggested that by acting “independently” perhaps “I can have
greater success in shaping the policies, practices and operations of
[WDC] than I had as a member of the board.” Eisner reportedly did
not consider Roy and Gold to be a great threat; however, history
proved him wrong because these events led to Roy and Gold launching
the ad hoc organization and Internet-based activist campaign known
as Save Disney.
The Save Disney campaign is interesting not only for its
magnitude and unique approach, but in this context it marks a turning
point in how WDC issues are discussed. Of interest here is a turn from
practices that clearly violated discourse ethics procedures by
preventing open debate to interaction that allowed space for the
rhetorical arguments of multiple stakeholders. It is this turn that is the
focus of the rest of this analysis.
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Save Disney’s Contribution to Dialogue
While the Save Disney campaign used multiple tools, including
an email list-serv and in-person visits to proxy services, the focal point
of the campaign was a website launched in December 2003. The
original website was very simple, with a one-paragraph introduction
and links to Roy’s and Gold’s resignation letters along with a thank you
message/explanation from Roy to all Disney cast members.2 A
disclaimer at the bottom of the page noted: “This website has been
established to provide a forum for discussing, analyzing and critiquing
the performance, direction, and management of The Walt Disney
Company.” In contrast to the culture of the board, which served to
stifle discussion and debate, Roy and Gold were creating a forum
through which they could share and debate existing WDC
communication as well as their own communication that had been
silenced by the Disney board. Thus, Roy and Gold reasserted the need
for the WDC to engage in dialogue.
In early January 2004, Roy and Gold introduced a more
sophisticated website. There, they laid out the primary goal of the
campaign. This stated goal represents the central utterance and first
step in the discourse ethics procedure that we focus on for the
remainder of this analysis (see Table 13.1). In a letter on January 27,
2004, they urged shareholders to vote “NO on the reelection of
Michael Eisner, George Mitchell, Judith Estrin, and John Bryson as
directors,” because “they symbolize, respectively, the poor
management, poor governance, poor compensation practices, and lack
of board independence that are impeding the development of longterm shareholder value at The Walt Disney Company.” This was the
same goal Roy and Gold worked to achieve from within the board.
The launch of the Save Disney campaign represented a new
opportunity to move through a discourse ethics procedure. Beginning
with the selection of the utterance, instead of suggesting an external
review of the board’s processes, the Save Disney campaign argued for
the removal of the individuals who seemed most closely linked to the
lack of debate occurring on the board, that is, to the shutting down of
a discourse ethics procedure. They then considered all who were being
and would be affected by the implementation of this utterance and
came up with a broad set of stakeholders. In stark contrast to the
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narrowly defined appropriate public as determined by the WDC board,
on December 10, 2003, a posting on the site explained that the
SaveDisney.com website was “devoted to those concerned about the
welfare of The Walt Disney Company and its future direction.” Next we
turn to how the primary claim was publicly debated.
The Save Disney website actively invited public discussion and
participation. It provided colorful graphics, streaming audio and video,
extensive links to stories on the company, interactive poll questions,
an invitation for any site visitor to join the SaveDisney.com mailing
list, personal and frequently updated statements from Roy, and
postings of news and commentaries relating to the company from
around the world. There were also distinct sections for different
categories of stakeholders including: families, consumers, and
employees. As such, the website invited participation by company
shareholders, but also a wide range of external stakeholder groups.
Comments and stories from visitors to the site frequently became
highlighted contributions to the website and campaign.
While a wide variety of Disney stakeholders were publicly
participating in discussions about the contested practices of the WCD
and its leadership via the SaveDisney.com website and its list-serv,
finding relevant public discussion and responses from the WDC board
and/or Eisner is more challenging. In December 2003, a brief WDC
press release announcing new board members was the only official
statement that even implied Roy's and Gold's departures. Much more
visible were Roy’s and Gold’s in-person and video-conference
presentations of their positions and reasoning to proxy advisory
services in early 2004. On February 2nd, they made a particularly
important presentation to Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS).
Shortly after the presentation, ISS issued a public report questioning
WDC’s strength and the blending of management and board positions.
ISS recommended that shareholders vote “withhold” on Eisner, and
that they should wait and see what changes that vote generated in the
company before voting no on other board members (Stewart, 2005).
Such moves may have finally prodded the WDC board into
entering public discussion of the contested issues. On February 6,
2004, the board of directors issued a statement to shareholders
acknowledging and refuting the challenges being generated through
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the Save Disney campaign. In addition to highlighting current Disney
successes, several lines were devoted to rebutting Save Disney
arguments about the poor governance and lack of board
independence. However, the overall message of the statement was
that Roy and Gold were wrong to be challenging the company: “You
may have heard recently about the attack being waged by two former
directors against the chief executive officer and certain members of
the Board of Directors of your company. You should be disturbed by
this attack” (Walt Disney Company, February 6,2004). The letter went
on to characterize Roy’s and Gold’s actions as “trying to distract the
Board and management.” These statements from the WDC board
highlight the degree to which the board was still operating under the
assumptions that dissent was unhelpful and that non-board members
had no business trying to engage in debate about company policies.
Also, while a response to the Save Disney campaign, these comments
do not directly respond to the content of Roy’s and Gold’s claims.
Rather, in their statement, board members were challenging Roy’s and
Gold’s right to make such claims. Couched in the scheme of
communicative action, the board was challenging the rightness and
sincerity of the Save Disney claims, while leaving alone the issue of
the truth of the campaign’s statements.
In an open letter to shareholders posted on the SaveDisney.com
website on February 12, 2004, Roy and Gold responded to the
accusations of being an inappropriate distraction:
We disagree with the Board’s attitude that this is not the time
for dissent. In our view, open discussion is essential to good
corporate governance and the creation of shareholder value,
regardless of whether the stock price is up or down. We made
every effort as Board members to engage the Board in a
constructive dialogue regarding the crucial issues facing Disney
in the past few years, when Disney’s stock price traded in the
teens. Our efforts were deprecated and rebuffed. If it was not
the time to challenge management then, and it is not the time
to challenge management now, when is the time?
They then restated their position on the WDC: “We believe Disney
needs a Board and senior management who will approach difficult
issues head-on, after giving careful consideration to disparate points of
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view.” In contrast with the statements offered by the WDC board,
these comments speak directly to the truth, rightness, and sincerity of
the board’s claim. Roy and Gold addressed the argument that they are
not sincere or the appropriate people to address these issues. In part
they respond by making an implicit call for a discourse ethics
procedure, approaching issues, hearing various stakeholders, and
facing them head on. They concluded by saying: “We believe that
Disney’s current senior management seeks to avoid this type of
dialogue and our Board experience has confirmed that the Board is
unwilling to pursue this type of exchange.” The focus of the Save
Disney campaign was the failure of the current leadership; however, in
advancing this argument, the campaign managers also asserted the
need for dialogue.
The WDC board responded to the Save Disney campaign’s
efforts with its own letter, on February 17th. The directors argued that
the company was on strong financial ground, but did not address any
of the challenges about a lack of dialogue on the board. Instead, most
of the letter again tried to undermine the credibility of Gold and Roy:
“In the face of this significant recovery, it is unfortunate that Stanley
Gold and his client Roy Disney persist in waging their distractive
propaganda campaign against The Walt Disney Company and its Board
of Directors.” Under a subheading of “The bottomline for Disney
shareholders” the directors declared, “You have every right to be
concerned that [Roy and Gold] are putting their own interests ahead of
yours.” However, nowhere did the board state what Roy’s and Gold’s
interests were or how they might differ from the reader’s own
interests.
The day before the shareholder meeting on March 2nd, board
member Mitchell argued in the Wall Street Journal that “The changes
we have made have resulted, from our listening. We listened to the
concerns that have been expressed about the company and about all
of corporate America” (Mitchell, 2004). However, the concerns the
board “heard” were about boards that are too large, and lacking
independence, diversity, and expertise, and not about the actual
leadership of the company. By this time, the Save Disney list serv had
approximately 35,000 registered members who received regular email
updates from Roy and the campaign (Magill, 2004), but Mitchell did
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not directly address the campaign and its claims about WDC
leadership.
At the official shareholder meeting, Gold and Roy spoke to 3000
shareholders (Orwall, Steinberg, & Lublin, 2004). Roy reasoned: “We
need to install a new management team, one that understands and
believes in the enormously valuable legacy that’s been entrusted to
us.” As usual, Gold’s rhetoric was harsher: “Let me be clear. No half
measures, no excuses, no amount of spinning will be tolerated.
Michael Eisner must leave now” (as cited in Stewart, 2005, p. 509).
At the end of the meeting, the initial voting tallies were
announced. Whether accidental or not, Stewart (2005) reported that
Eisner attempted to adjourn the meeting without announcing any
voting results. When attendees chanted “vote, vote,” Eisner said, “I
almost got away with that, didn't I?” (Ahrens, 2004). While only the
initial raw numbers were read at the meeting, according to final official
numbers released in April 2004, Michael Eisner had received a no
confidence vote from 45.37% of shareholders, and board member
George Mitchell received a 25.69% no confidence vote (“Walt Disney
Co.,” 2004). On the surface, the vote demonstrated a near split. But in
the context of the typical full support recorded in shareholder board
elections, and the realization that the 45% withhold vote represented
the largest withhold vote ever received by a CEO, the will of the
oppositional voice was clear.
Later that evening, the WDC issued a press release announcing
the decision to separate the positions of CEO and chairman of the
company, creating a new position of Chairman of the Board, to which
George Mitchell was appointed (Walt Disney Company, March 3,
2004). This move did not end the disagreements among the company
stakeholders, but it was a catalyst for significant changes in WDC
governance over the ensuing five years. Six months later, Eisner
announced he would resign as CEO of the WDC effective September
2006. The Save Disney campaign praised the decision, but argued that
the change was not occurring soon enough, and continued to call for
Eisner’s immediate resignation. At this point, yet another utterance
went through the discourse ethics procedure.
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Eventually, Eisner agreed to step down in September 2005, and
to not seek reelection for his board position in 2006 (Marr,
Mangalindan, & Lublin, 2005). Eisner’s own choice for his successor,
Bob Iger, was appointed as CEO of WDC. After several meetings with
Iger in July 2005, the WDC, Roy, and Gold issued a joint statement
that they had come to a resolution and the Save Disney campaign
would come to an end (Orwall, 2005). Time will tell how much this
incident will influence public relations practice at the WDC.

Discourse Ethics Procedure and the Save Disney
Campaign
The events and discourse surrounding the Save Disney
campaign are intriguing in their own right as a historic and successful
challenge to corporate management practice. Beyond this, these
events provide a compelling example for considering opportunities and
challenges for dialogue between corporations and their stakeholders.
This outcome warrants our offering of several generalizations that help
define dialogic public relations.
In considering the “Vote No” utterance in the context of the
second step (identifying who would be affected by the implementation
of this utterance), we have established how the WDC board generated
a very narrow assessment of the relevant stakeholders (the board
members) and allowed Roy’s and Gold’s arguments to be shared only
with this select group. The board then refused to engage in discussion
and debate about the consequences of the utterance even among its
members and avoided making a judgment about the utterance, thus
straying from the discourse ethics procedure.
The launch of the Save Disney campaign represented an
attempt to expand the debate to a wider audience of stakeholders, and
consequently, restart the discourse ethics procedure. In stark contrast
to the narrowly defined appropriate publics as determined by the WDC
board, the Save Disney website was “devoted to those concerned
about the welfare of The Walt Disney Company and its future
direction” (December 10, 2003 website). The website included
comments directed at WDC board members, employees, shareholders,
and consumers. The creation of the Save Disney campaign and
website allowed Roy and Gold to enact step three (articulating the
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utterance to everyone they had identified as potentially affected by it).
While the prevailing communication culture of the board was one that
stifled debate, the tactics of the Save Disney campaign forced the
WDC board members to participate in step three (albeit in limited
terms).
The fourth step of the discourse ethics procedure entails debate
among the parties about the consequences and value of the utterance.
Shareholder concerns were articulated and discussion was allowed.
During this fourth step of debate, the conditions of communicative
action become most relevant. Communicative action prescribes specific
criteria for debate among stakeholders. The statements offered by the
campaign and the resulting responses from the WDC represent the
bulk of the discussion and debate in this campaign. A focus on the
various bases of validity that communicative action entails helps to
explain in part the way in which this debate played out. Rather than
addressing the truth (factual validity) of the Save Disney claims, the
WDC board members focused on the rightness and sincerity of these
claims. In contrast, the Save Disney campaign focused on the factual
truth of the WDC statements and emphasized the degree to which the
board was not being sincere in its communication. The end result is
that the two parties were not engaged in productive debate or
dialogue.
While the focus here has been on the debate between the Save
Disney campaign managers and the WDC board, other stakeholders
did participate in this debate. The investor proxy services participated
through public statements supporting the Save Disney campaign’s
advocacy for withholding support for Eisner. Employees, shareholders,
and consumers voiced their support for the arguments made by Roy
and Gold. However, only direct WDC shareholders could participate in
the formal vote about the utterance under consideration.
Finally, the fifth step, forming judgment on the validity and
acceptability of the norm, was enacted through the vote at the annual
shareholder meeting. The results sent a clear message that many
stakeholders believed that Eisner and his fellow board members should
be removed, thus supporting the initial claims made by Roy and Gold.
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In the end, the arguments of the Save Disney campaign
prevailed, but not without a long and difficult fight. The success of the
Save Disney campaign can be attributed in part to the degree to which
its actions embraced the discourse ethics procedure. While its
participation in discussions with the WDC did not always directly
address the claims made by the company, it did remain true to the
ideal of involving a broad range of stakeholders and allowing for open
exchange. This is perhaps the greatest failure and missed opportunity
of the WDC. Eisner and the board clearly overlooked the potential
impact of such a public dialogue, and as such, participated in the
dialogue in a limited sense. It is unclear if outcomes would have been
different had the WDC fully participated in the discussion. However,
this stands as a missed opportunity for the company. What remains to
be seen is if the corporate governance at WDC will now follow a
deliberation procedure with its publics that is more in line with
discourse ethics.

Discussion
Corporations today are more likely to acknowledge their
accountability to their shareholders and the board members who
represent them, particularly given the recent corporate scandals.
However, the case covered here occurred after the Enron, WorldCom,
and Tyco scandals and yet the WDC’s CEO, Eisner, appeared to forget
that he needed to engage in dialogue even with the company’s board
members. The blurred lines between internal and external publics also
became clear in this case as rhetorical discussions that were originally
limited to a very internal locus, eventually became front page news
across the country, playing out for both internal and external publics.
What is also significant to note about the events leading up to
the campaign is the degree to which the board action parallels
Habermas's description of the colonization of the lifeworld and failure
to create conditions of communicative action. Board members such as
Roy and Gold found that even in their privileged internal company
position, when they had an utterance to share, they did not get to
decide who the stakeholders in that utterance were (step two), had to
seek Eisner’s permission before they could share the utterance with
most stakeholders (step three), debate of the utterance was often
squelched (step four), and judgments of many utterances were not
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allowed (step five). According to such accounts, Eisner and the board
had created a communicative culture that cut off dialogue. In contrast,
Pearson (1989b) argued that "dialogue is a precondition for any
legitimate corporate conduct that affects a public of that organization"
(p.128).
This case serves as a cautionary tale to managements that
might still be inclined not to pursue or even to stop dialogic relations
with their publics. Habermas’s discourse ethics suggests that even
when someone or something attempts to circumvent the procedure,
the principle of universalization is just that, universal. The principle
and its procedure will be pursued by interlocutors. Just as board
members, victims’ families, donors, and elected officials found a path
to enact a discourse ethics procedure in the Liberty Fund case, so did
stakeholders of the Disney company. Once it became clear that
presentations of positions and arguments that ran counter to Eisner’s
would not be entertained or heard, that is, that a process even
remotely resembling a procedure of discourse ethics was not in place
on the board, Roy and Gold left the boardroom and found an
alternative path for enacting a discourse ethics procedure. Thus, the
current chapter demonstrates how Principle U plays out in public
relations. These days, corporations are increasingly aware of their
accountability to a wide range of publics, and further research can
explore how a discourse ethics procedure plays out among a wider
range of organizational stakeholders. This procedure offers a useful
plan for organization–public communication as well as a scholarly tool
for assessing such relationships.
It should also be noted that the recent development and impact
of the Internet played a significant role in facilitating the discourse
ethics procedure in this case, but had both strengths and weaknesses.
On the positive side, it clearly allowed Roy and Gold to interact with a
wide range of stakeholders. Anyone who could access the Internet and
felt a linkage to the WDC, could become a member of the campaign
and participate in discussions through the site. However, the Save
Disney web team carefully controlled the website and our analysis of
the extensive website found only one letter posted from an employee
that was mildly critical of the Save Disney stance. It is unclear if voices
of opposition to the campaign were censored from or simply were not
submitted to the website.
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This uncertainty reminds us that while the Save Disney
campaign might have been clamoring for more dialogic public relations
between the WDC and its publics, the campaign website itself was not
a fully dialogic site. It offered a voice for a stance that was not being
allowed within the WDC, but didn’t provide much divergence on its
own pages. While the campaign encouraged debate, only one choice:
was advocated on the website. Thus, it took the input from the WDC,
the Save Disney campaign, other websites, the formal press, and
untold others to generate a truly dialogic space.
This finding points to a final contribution of this case study,
which is to highlight the degree to which dialogue exists in a much
broader space than previously imagined. Dialogue does not simply
entail exchanges between two parties in a single interaction. Rather, it
seems in today's ever-changing communication climate that dialogue
entails participation from multiple parties, in a variety of forums.
Further rhetorically based research could focus on websites that claim
to be (and may be) a forum for all sides of an issue. Studies and
examples like these can further enhance our understanding, pursuit,
and analysis of dialogic public relations.

Notes
1. While some scholars suggest that agreement is the ideal goal of
public relations, we suggest that even when agreement is not
possible, understanding of divergent positions can still be
beneficial for organization–public relations.
2. All Disney employees are known as cast members.
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Appendix
Table 13.1 Steps of Discourse Ethics for the Save Disney Campaign
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